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'To believe that one's own theories are facts is considered by many contemporary psychiatrists as a 'symptom' of schizophrenia. Yet this is what the language of the Durham decision does. It reifies some of the shakiest and most controversial aspects of contemporary psychiatry (i.e., those pertaining to what is 'mental disease' and the classification of such alleged diseases) and by legal fiat seeks to transform inadequate theory into 'judicial fact." Dr. T. S. Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 Colum.L.Rev. 183, 190 (1958).

'Durham takes the notion of 'mental illness' and requires the psychiatrist and the jury to determine whether the criminal act in question was committed as a result of such 'illness.' This, too, (like disease) is supposed to be a 'fact.' Unfortunately, this not only cannot be a fact, but it cannot even be a theory. * * * The very occurrence of the crime -- of almost any crime today -- functions as a powerful impetus for the creation of a theory to explain it.' Szasz, Psychiatry, Ethics, and the Criminal Law, 58 Colum.L.Rev. 183, 190-91 (1958).

As cited in: BLOCKER v. UNITED STATES, No. 15777, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT, 110 U.S. App. D.C. 41; 288 F.2d 853; 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 5164, November 16, 1960, Argued, March 3, 1961, Decided

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